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The "Mothers' Pension" movement dates back to 1911, in which year laws were enacted in Missouri and Illinois. In 1919, eight years later, laws providing for the relief of dependent children living with their mothers had been adopted in thirty-nine states and in Alaska and Hawaii. While the purpose underlying all these laws is that of preventing the breaking up of the home when the support of the natural bread winner is removed, the methods adopted to secure this end and the conditions under which relief may be granted, differ in the different states. The condition of receiving aid is uniformly that of poverty. In some states, the law applies only to widowed mothers; in others, to deserted, divorced, unmarried and even expectant mothers. In some states, relief may be given to the guardian or custodian who takes the place of the mother.

The maximum age of the child for whose care allowance is made usually corresponds with the age at which he may be legally employed. The amount of allowance authorized varies from a maximum of \$9.00 per month for each child to whatever amount is necessary to care properly for the child. The source of funds may be the State, the County, or both the State and County Treasuries. The administering agencies include the Juvenile Court, County Commissioners, Boards of Children's Guardians, Local Boards of Child Welfare, Municipal Boards of Mothers' Aid, Overseers of the Poor, Unpaid Board of Women Trustees, State Agent of the State Treasury, Boards of Education and State Board of Charities.

Quoting from the summary—"It is apparent from the wide variations in these laws and the frequent changes which have been made in them that they are still in the experimental stage. The rapid growth of the movement in so brief a period of years is indicative of a widely held and deeply rooted conviction that home life and a mother's care are of such great value to the proper rearing of children that no child should be deprived of their benefits on account of poverty alone. But the method by which these are to be assured for all children has not yet been fully worked out. Some of the most ardent supporters of the 'Mothers' Pension' laws do not regard them as an ultimate attainment, but rather as an intermediate development which will in time, in a large measure at least, give place to some more democratic scheme of social insurance."

The publication was prepared to meet an urgent demand for information in regard to the subject and it splendidly fills this need.

Juvenile Court, Chicago.

JOSEPH L. MOSS.

A FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN INSTINCTS. By J. R. Kantor. *Psychological Review*, vol. XXVII, No. 1; January, 1920; pp. 50-72.

This article presents an unusually well thought, thorough statement of the human instincts from the functional and behavioristic point of view. The author avoids the Scylla of stating instinct as a mystic force or potency which somehow drives the individual to serve purposes he knows not of; nor does he become engulfed by the Charybdis

of seeing in instinct nothing but the functioning of a set of inherited neuro-muscular reflexes. He recognizes the fact that the individual is endowed at birth with a set of psychophysical tendencies (the author would probably prefer to say "reaction systems") which develop in partial independence of subsequent experience. To these he reserves the name instincts. He also recognizes that these instincts constitute an integral and important part of all, or nearly all, human behavior which is in that sense instinctive behavior. The only form of human behavior which is not instinctive is rational behavior, which arises in the course of instinctive behavior and is "always initiated by reflective consideration of ways and means."

The thought of the article is developed largely through the critique of other authors, principally Stout, McDougall, Thorndike and Drever. The presentation is somewhat abstract and presupposes acquaintance with the author's conception of "conscious behavior." It will repay the careful study of every student of psychology.

CURT ROSENOW.

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PRINCIPII DI CRIMINOLOGIA. Vol. II. Part Generale. (Circostanze Discriminanti, scusanti ed aggravanti.) Del *Professor Francesco De Luca*, dell' Università di Catania. Cav. Vincenzo Giannotta, Editore, 1920.

[Principles of Criminology. Vol. II. General Part. (Justifying, excusing and aggravating circumstances.) By Professor Francesco De Luca of the University of Catania, Sicily. Cav. Vincenzo Giannotta, Publisher, 1920.]

We should have more books of this sort on criminology. It gives us Americans just what we need. It is a philosophic discussion of the bases of law—a discussion which, because we call it philosophic, is none the less vital to the proper comprehension of the law and to the adequate treatment of the criminal. The translations of European treatises which have within the last decade appeared in this country have already produced advantageous marks upon our scholarship, upon our law, and upon the attitude of teachers, students, lawyers and judges.

The work is an application of psychology, psychiatry, biology and sociology to law. The law cannot progress unless it keep informed of the progress in other sciences. The law must of necessity be based upon other sciences; and for law to close its eyes to the advances in those sciences is to miss the path that leads to truth and justice. Anglo-American law has moved on in conformity with changes in life in England and in this country; but the movement has been slow, and has not kept pace with the changes in life. Anthropology, psychology, biology, psychiatry, economics, sociology, criminology, philosophy have all contributed elements for the enlightenment of law, but law has been a willful soul and has obstinately refused to listen to the promptings of those sciences upon which it must rest. There is ample